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Buchanan v. Gilmore
139 F.3d 982 (4th Cir. 1998)
I. Facts
On the afternoon of September 15, 1987, Douglas McArthur Buchanan,Jr.
took a rifle to his father's house. Buchanan argued with his father about his
natural mother's death from breast cancer. As the argument became more heated,
Buchanan shot his father in the back of the head, killing him instantly. Following
the shooting of his father, Buchanan remained at his father's house. When his
two half-brothers returned from school, Buchanan shot them both. One died
from the gunshot wound; Buchanan killed the other with a kitchen knife. Bu-
chanan remained in his father's house, waiting for his stepmother to return from
work. When she arrived, Buchanan stabbed her to death with a kitchen knife.'
Buchanan was convicted in the Circuit Court of Amherst County of the
capital murder of more than one person as part of the same act or transaction.2
The jury returned with a unanimous verdict in favor of the death penalty and the
trial court sentenced Buchanan to death.3 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed Buchanan's conviction and sentence.4 Buchanan subse-
quently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court of the Western District of Virginia. The district court denied the petition.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.' The
Supreme Court of the United States granted Buchanan's petition for a writ of
certiorari and ultimately affirmed the decision of the Fourth Circuit.6
Five days before his scheduled execution, Buchanan filed an action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against GovernorJames S. Gilmore, II. In this action, Buchanan
alleged that "inasmuch as the Governor served as Attorney General of Virginia
in prior proceedings concerning his case, he is disqualified by a conflict of inter-
est from considering his clemency application."' The district court denied the
Commonwealth's motion to dismiss and enjoined Buchanan's execution.
1. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 757, 760-61 (Va. 1989).
2. Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757,759 (1998). See also VA. CODE § 18.2-31(7) (1996).
3. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 760.
4. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 757 (1989), cert. denied sub nom., Buchanan v.
Virginia, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990).
5. Buchanan v. Angelone, 103 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 1996). See aLro Case Summary of Buchanan
v. Angeone, CAP. DEF.J., vol. 9, no. 2, p. 29 (1997).
6. Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998). See also Case Summary of Buchanan v.
Angeone, CAP. DEF.J., vol. 10, no. 2, p. 4 (1998).
7. Buchanan v. Gilmore, 139 F.3d 982, 983 (4th Cir. 1998).
8. Buchanan, 139 F.3d at 983.
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11. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the stay
of execution and reversed the preliminary injunction granted by the district court.
IIL Anaysis/Application in Virginia
Without any reasoning of its own or any explanation for its decision, the
Fourth Circuit cited Pickens v. Tucker' and dismissed Buchanan's §1983 action."
The Fourth Circuit apparently cited Pickens for the proposition that the "Rule of
Necessity" applies when the clemency authority is vested solely in the Gover-
nor." Presumably, the court concluded that Governor Gilmore was not "unable
to discharge the power[ ] and dut[y] of his office"' 2 in considering Buchanan's
clemency application because no due process protections attach to capital clem-
ency proceedings under Connecticut Board ofPardons v. Dumschat."3 This conclusion
is no longer valid.
In Ohio Adult Parole Authorit'y v. Woodard,4 decided one week after Buchanan
v. Gilmore, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed" that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does apply to capital clemency proceedings. 6
Now that the Court has stated that the Due Process Clause does apply, an
impartial decision maker is required. 7
In Virginia, the requirement of an impartial decision maker is especially
important. The current governor, James S. Gilmore, III, has previously served
as both Attorney General of Virginia and a Commonwealth's Attorney. As
Attorney General, Governor Gilmore represented the Commonwealth in oppos-
ing the appeals and habeas petitions of many of the inmates who will be seeking
9. 851 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Ark.), aft'd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir. 1994).
10. Idlat 984.
11. Buchanan, 139 F.3d at 984 (citing Pickens v. Tucker, 851 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Ark.), aft'd,
23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir. 1994)).
12. VA. CONST. art. V, § 16.
13. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
14. 118 S. Ct. 1244 (1998).
15. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion on the due process issue in which Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Souter joined. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion on the due process issue.
Therefore, Justices O'Connor, Breyer, Souter, Ginsberg, and Stevens make up the majority of the
Court on the due process issue. The Chief Justice's opinion on the due process issue was joined
only by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. It does not constitute the opinion of
the Court.
16. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118 S. Ct. 1244, 1253-54 (1998) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment). See also Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1254-55
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
17. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970) (stating that "an impartial
decisionmaker is essential" under the Due Process Clause); & Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
334 S. Ct. 893 (1976) (same). For an in depth examination of the requirements of due process and
clemency proceedings see Brian S. Clarke, In Search of Clemengy Procedures We Can Live With: What




clemency in the next two years. Additionally, Gilmore served as Common-
wealth's Attorney for Henrico County from 1987 until 1993. During his tenure,
at least one defendant, Kevin Cardwell, was sentenced to death.'" It may be
possible for the Commonwealth to argue in rebuttal that there is no evidence that
Governor Gilmore would not decide the application for clemency in a fair and
impartial manner. Senior Judge Gibson of the Eighth Circuit countered this
argument very effectively in his dissent in Otfy v. Stenber. 9
The attorney general, having successfully obtained affirmance of Otey's death
sentence in the Nebraska Supreme Court, and successfully represented the
State in Otey's habeas case, can hardly be expected to oppose the execution
of this sentence. As prosecutor, the attorney general determined that it
served the public welfare to seek the death penalty as the appropriate punish-
ment for Otey. It is unreasonable to assume that the attorney general would
freely consider the same sentence inappropriate at a clemency hearing .... 20
Judge Gibson's analysis applies with equal force to situations such as the one in
Virginia. Based on the due process requirement of an impartial decision maker,
the Governor should be deemed unable to consider the clemency applications
of those inmates whose trials' or appeals were conducted during his term as
Attorney General. The Lieutenant Governor should make these determinations
in light of the Governor's inability to do so.2
Brian S. Clarke
18. In addition to Mr. Cardwell, there may be other death row inmates convicted during
Gilmore's term as Commonwealth's Attorney for Henrico County. These inmates will have an even
more compelling case for Gilmore's disqualification if their clemency petitions are up for review
prior to the expiration of Gilmore's term as Governor in January of 2002.
19. 34 F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1994).
20. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (Gibson, S.J., dissenting).
21. VA. CONST. art. V, § 16.
1998]

